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The Craig-Washington Debate
Does God Exist?
Dr. Craig's Third Rebuttal
I. No good reasons to think
that atheism is true
The choice before us tonight is whether atheism or theism is more plausibly
true. I've tried to argue tonight that there are no good reasons to think
that atheism is true. And basically what it's come down to in the last
speech is the problem of harm. The question is: if God is all-good, is
it logically possible that He could create a world involving harm? If God
is all-powerful, is it logically possible that He couldn't create a world
of free creatures in which there is no harm? It seems to me that Dr. Washington
has not been able to demonstrate either of the two premises that are essential
to his argument to show that God and harm are logically incompatible.
He says, "Well, it wouldn't be so bad to have a world in which
there were no natural laws and you could do whatever you want." I'll
simply rest my case in saying that that is logically incompatible with
moral maturity, with maturity and responsibility and agency. And I think
it is logically possible that God might choose to prefer a world in which
moral maturity and responsibility are goods He wants to achieve. And as
long as that's logically possible, it follows there's no incompatibility
between God and harm.
What about God's having morally sufficient reasons for permitting the
harm in the world? I gave a number of suggestions why God might have such
reasons. Dr. Washington says, "This is capitulatory." It's not
at all capitulatory.{1} What I'm
saying is that we're not in a good position to assess with confidence the
probability of whether God could have a morally sufficient reason for permitting
any specific evil. Let me give you an example from science: chaos theory.
In chaos theory, it's been shown that even the flutter of a butterfly's
wings could set in motion forces that would result in a hurricane over
the Atlantic, and yet no one observing that butterfly would be able to
predict that outcome. Similarly, when we see, say, the murder of an innocent
man, we have no idea of what ripple effect that might send through history,
how God's morally sufficient reason for permitting that might not emerge
until later. We're simply not in a good position to assess that kind of
probability.{2}
Dr. Washington says, "Well, look, but would you do evil, would
you lynch someone, to prevent harm?" I'm not saying that. I'm saying
that God allows harm to occur, which He will compensate for in the
afterlife, in order to achieve certain greater goods, like moral maturity
and human freedom.{3} As long as
that's even logically possible, it follows that God and harm are not incompatible.
Let me share just one last thought. What is the atheist's alternative?
On the atheist's alternative, we are locked in a world with gratuitous
and unredeemed evil, with absolutely no hope.{4}
It seems to me that God is in fact the only answer to the problem of evil
because He redeems us from evil. He gives us moral cleansing and forgiveness
from the evils we commit. And He offers us an afterlife of unspeakable
joy and happiness for eternity, in fellowship with Him, the source of infinite
goodness and love. God is ultimately the only solution to the problem of
harm.
II. Good reasons to think
that theism is true
Now what about the good reasons to think that theism is true?
The Argument from Abstract Objects
First, you need God as a foundation for the abstract objects that exist,
and they can't be merely human constructions.{5}
The Cosmological Argument
Second, you need God to explain the origin of the universe. Dr. Washington
has admitted there has to be a cause of the universe. And I think I showed
convincingly that it has the essential attributes of God: timelessness
and spacelessness, immateriality, and personality.{6}
The Teleological Argument
Third, the complex order of the universe requires a designer. Dr. Washington
says, "But you don't know that there is a being out there arranging
the conditions." The argument is for such a being.{7}
It's saying that there are two alternatives: chance or intelligent design.
And you would have to be crazy to think that this happened by chance, given
the odds against a life-permitting universe. Therefore, it follows that
design is the more plausible of the two explanations. I don't see how anybody
can deny that design is more plausible than chance, given the astronomical
odds against these initial conditions.
The Moral Argument
Fourth, objective moral values. I argued that they're rooted in the
nature of God Himself and that His moral commands flow necessarily from
His divine nature.{8}
The Resurrection of Jesus
Fifth, the historical facts of the life, death, and resurrection of
Jesus. You wouldn't believe in the silly sort of miracle that Dr. Washington
imagined because it has no religio-historical context of any significance.
But the resurrection of Jesus is different in that it occurs in the context
of Jesus' own unparalleled life and teachings and, particularly, his claim
to be the absolute revelation and divine son of God. In that context, Jesus'
resurrection makes good sense as God's vindication of those claims for
which Jesus was convicted for blasphemy. So I think that in the case of
Jesus you've got good evidence. Dr. Washington never denied the empty tomb,
the appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith.{9}
The Experience of God
Sixth, God can be immediately known and experienced. I wasn't raised
a Christian. I became a Christian in high school as a teenager and found
God to be a living reality in my life. I want to challenge you, when you
leave this debate, to go home and ask yourself, "Could there really
be a God who loves me, who revealed Himself in Christ, who could change
my life?" I believe that He could do that for you, just as He did
it for me. Thank you!
[applause]
Annotations
{1} Rather than respond to my
arguments that we are not in a position to judge confidently whether God
could have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the harm we observe,
Dr. Washington shifts to accusing God Himself of doing the evils so as
to bring about a greater good. His last rebuttal also emphasizes the same
accusation. This is an obvious caricature of the theistic position. God
need not do the harm in order to have morally sufficient reasons for permitting
harm to occur. To give an analogy: Think of the Allied commanders on D-Day
who ordered a frontal assault against the German gunpit atop the Point-du-Hoc
on the cliffs of Normandy. They knew that they were sending many of those
brave men to their deaths; but if the German guns were not taken out, the
whole invasion might have been compromised, the war effort against Nazi
Germany disastrously set back, the war prolonged, and countless more lives
lost. For the sake of the greater good, they ordered the assault. They
did not kill the American men--the German soldiers freely did that- -,
but they allowed, even directed, the men to be in a situation in which
they knew they would be killed. They had a morally sufficient reason for
allowing this harm. The most significant difference between God's case
and this analogy is that God has the ability to more than compensate those
who make the sacrifice for the greater good.
Dr. Washington also caricatures the theistic position when he suggests
in his last speech that on my view God allows the weak and the poor to
suffer so that the rich can develop into moral beings. I cannot imagine
how he can attribute this view to me. What I argued is that rational and
moral behavior requires a world that operates according to predictable
natural laws, and that natural harm may be a by-product of such a law-like
world, harm which God will more than compensate for in the after life.
It is no part of my view that harm is meted out to some just so others
may develop; on the contrary, if anything it is often those who suffer,
not the coddled, who develop morally. It is interesting to observe that
it is precisely in Latin America, Africa, and Asia that Christianity is
growing at over twice the rate of population growth, whereas in the West
it is moribund. What Dr. Washington's example really shows is how intertwined
natural and moral evil are in this world. In a sinless world, natural evil
would be vastly mitigated.
{2} See William Alston, "The
Inductive Problem of Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition," Philosophical
Perspectives, vol. 5: Philosophy of Religion, ed. James E. Tomberlin
(Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Press, 1991), pp. , who lists six limits
on our cognitive capacities pertinent to assessing the probability that
God could have a morally sufficient reason for permitting some evil. He
concludes,
The judgments required by the probabilistic argument from evil are of
a very special and enormously ambitious type, and our cognitive capacities
are not equal to this one. We are simply not in a position to justifiably
assert that God would have no sufficient reason for permitting evil. And
if that is right, the probabilistic argument from evil is in no better
shape than the late lamented logical argument from evil (Ibid., pp. 59,
61).
{3} In his final rebuttal Dr.
Washington says that it is question-begging to argue for God's existence
by assuming the reality of the afterlife. But, of course, that is not what
I am doing. I give six reasons to believe that the Christian God exists,
none of which assumes the reality of the afterlife. The mention of the
afterlife arises only in response to the atheistic claim that harm is incompatible
with God's existence or that gratuitous harm exists. My point is that neither
of these claims is plausible if the Christian view of immortality is true.
Dr. Washington needs to provide some reason to think that view is implausible.
In favor of the Christian view is the evidence for the resurrection of
Jesus, which is the harbinger of our own resurrection.
{4} Dostoyevsky's final answer
to the problem of harm was that the atheistic alternative was unlivable.
He showed in his novels that if God does not exist, then "all things
are permitted," even the most terrible of atrocities. His atheist
character Ivan Karamazov, quoted by Dr. Washington, finally finds it impossible
to live within the framework of an atheistic worldview.
{5} As I re-read the debate,
I am struck by how weak Dr. Washington's response to this argument was.
He only makes some vague gestures toward some sort of constructivism without
showing how this accounts of the full range of abstract objects or answering
my objection that there are numbers which no one has conceived. Perhaps
he will address these issues more fully in his annotations; but then I
shall have no opportunity to respond, since our annotations were prepared
independently. I can only refer the reader to my suggestions for further
reading.
{6} Again, Dr. Washington's
response to this argument, in my opinion one of the most compelling arguments
for God, was virtually non-existent. He actually concedes both premisses
and the conclusion and does not rebut my deduction of the principal divine
attributes. Not knowing what he will say in his annotations, I have no
recourse but to refer the reader to the suggested further reading.
{7} Dr. Washington seems to
have lost his way in the argument here. His lottery illustration was meant
to show that improbability alone is not a proof of design. I agreed and
argued that the probability in question also had to be specified in some
way, as, e.g., if the lottery winners all had Mafia connections.
In the same way the initial conditions of the universe are both inconceivably
improbable and specified with respect to the production of intelligent
life. That the design inference does not beg the question of the existence
of an agent is evident in cases where we do not know and want to discover
whether there are such agents, as in the search for a signal from extra-terrestrial
intelligence or in an archaeological dig.
{8} In his last rebuttal, to
which I could not, of course, respond, Dr. Washington says that he does
not admit my premiss that if God does not exist, objective moral values
do not exist. But then he goes on to make the remarkable admission,
"I don't have the answer to what explains objective moral truths."
That is precisely the problem: atheism lacks the resources to account for
the objective moral values which we all intuit. Richard Taylor, an eminent
non-Christian philosopher, is especially forthright on this point. He says,
The idea of political or legal obligation is clear enough . . . . Similarly,
the idea of an obligation higher than this, and referred to as moral
obligation, is clear enough, provided reference to some lawmaker higher
. . . than those of the state is understood. In other words, our moral
obligations can . . . be understood as those that are imposed by God. This
does give a clear sense to the claim that our moral obligations are more
binding upon us than our political obligations . . . . But what if this
higher-than-human lawgiver is no longer taken into account? Does the concept
of a moral obligation . . . still make sense? . . . the concept of moral
obligation [is] unintelligible apart from the idea of God. The words remain
but their meaning is gone.
. . . The modern age, more or less repudiating the idea of a divine
lawgiver, has nevertheless tried to retain the ideas of moral right and
wrong, not noticing that, in casting God aside, they have also abolished
the conditions of meaningfulness for moral right and wrong as well (Richard
Taylor, Ethics, Faith and Reason [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
Hall, 1985] pp. 83-84, 2- 3).
So why does Dr. Washington resist God's being the source of moral values?--Apparently
because of the Euthyphro Dilemma, which I in turn answered. Dr. Washington
says in his last speech that he doesn't understand the solution I gave.
I'm surprised at this, since it represents the classical theistic position
and seems quite clear to me. If the reader shares Dr. Washington's perplexity,
take a look at my suggestions for further reading.
{9} Dr. Washington evinces
no familiarity with the literature concerning the historicity of Jesus'
empty tomb, post-mortem appearances, or the origin of the belief in Jesus's
resurrection, all three of which are regarded as historical by the majority
of critical scholars today. Rather his skepticism is rooted in a philosophical
bias against miracles derived from Hume. What the reader may not realize
is that philosophers generally recognize that Hume's argument against the
identification of a miracle is fallacious. Hume assumed the principle:
it is always more probable that the testimony to a miracle is false
than that the miracle occurred. But this principle is wrong. The hypothesis
that "God raised Jesus from the dead," for example, is not improbable
with respect to either our background knowledge or the specific facts of
the case. What is improbable is the hypothesis that "Jesus rose naturally
from the dead." That hypothesis is fantastically improbable, given
what we know of the necrosis of human cells. Hypotheses like the conspiracy
theory, the apparent death theory, the legend theory, are all more probable
than that. But they are not more probable than the hypothesis "God
raised Jesus from the dead," unless you have independent grounds for
thinking God's existence to be improbable (which, I've argued, we do not).
Indeed, relative to the specific evidence of the case, the hypothesis "God
raised Jesus from the dead" is more probable (or a better explanation)
than hypotheses like conspiracy, apparent death, etc. Hume believed
that the testimony for the laws of nature always counterbalances or outweighs
the testimony to a miracle. But this is incorrect, since the testimony
to the laws of nature at best proves that people do not rise naturally
from the dead. That in no way contradicts the hypothesis that God
raised Jesus from the dead. Indeed, the Christian believes both these truths.
The reason we are skeptical about President Gerberding's flying around
campus is that this is naturally impossible and there is nothing in the
religio-historical context of the event to make us suspect that God would
do such a thing. But, as I explained, it is radically different in the
case of Jesus' resurrection, given his own unparalleled life and teaching.
Well, then, how good is the evidence for the facts of the empty tomb,
the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the disciples' belief in
the resurrection? In his last rebuttal, Dr. Washington finally gets around
to addressing that question. Notice that he does not say anything to dispute
the fact of the empty tomb. Nor does he offer any refutation of the fact
of Jesus' post-mortem appearances. Rather he directs all his attention
to the question of the origin of the disciples' belief in the resurrection.
He does not deny that the first disciples came sincerely to believe in
Jesus' resurrection and were willing to go to their deaths for that belief.
In my opening speech I argued that the disciples' belief cannot be explained
in terms of either Christian influences or Jewish influences. I did not
mention pagan influences because no informed scholar today would hold such
a thing. This sort of explanation was popular back around the turn of the
century in the so-called "History of Religions School." The movement
soon collapsed, however, principally for two reasons: (i) The supposed
parallels are spurious. In his important study The Post- Resurrection
Appearance Stories of the Gospel Tradition (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag,
1975), John Alsup has examined all the alleged parallels to Jesus' resurrection
and shown them to be apotheosis stories, disappearance stories, etc.,
not resurrection accounts. The myths of dying and rising gods like Osiris
or Adonis, for example, concern merely seasonal symbols for the crop cycle--the
plants dying in winter and coming back to life in the spring. (ii) There
is no causal link to the disciples' belief. This is evident in Dr.
Washington's own examples from ancient Mexico or Nepal. According to Gerhard
Kittel, there is "no trace" of myths of dying and rising gods
in first century Palestine (Gerhard Kittel, "Die Auferstehung Jesu,"
Deutsche Theologie 4 [1937]: 159). Thus, no informed scholar would
today argue that the original disciples came to believe that Jesus rose
from the dead due to pagan influences. It is not surprising that as a philosopher
Dr. Washington should be unfamiliar with the field of New Testament studies
and historical Jesus research; but it is a shame that this sort of ignorance
should be perpetuated among students.
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Updated: 13 July 2002
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