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First Things
Books In Review
The Rise of Neoconservatism
Copyright (c) 1996 First Things 63 (May 1996): 49-71.
What Have You Done for Us Lately?
The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign
Affairs, 1945-1994. By John Ehrman. Yale University Press.
241 pp. $27.50.
Reviewed by A. J. Bacevich
This slender volume delivers somewhat less than its imposing title
promises. If it covers the ground assigned, it seldom probes beneath the
surface. Useful as far as it goes, it doesn't go far enough. Still,
The Rise of Neoconservatism merits attention if only because it
serves as a cautionary tale. Although not by design, this book
highlights the pitfalls inherent in writing intellectual history across
the divide separating our new era-incompletely formed and imperfectly
perceived-and the postwar era that shaped our collective consciousness
but that now lies decisively in the past.
The tale of the neoconservatives makes for a worthy topic, one rich with
fascinating personalities and laden with drama. In the aftermath of
Vietnam, a band of mostly New York-based, largely Jewish, passionately
anti-Communist, and thoroughly combative literary intellectuals abandon
liberalism and the Democratic Party (both of which they had come to view
as irredeemably corrupted) and throw their impressive energies into a
vigorous campaign aimed at salvaging American foreign policy. They
succeed and in the process contribute mightily to the rise of a new
conservative coalition that achieves political dominance: this is a
story to which scholars will no doubt be returning again and again. The
definitive study eventually resulting from that scholarly enterprise
will yield a plethora of insights about the role of the intellectual in
American life, the impact of ideas and ideology on American politics,
and the temper of the American intellectual milieu at the close of the
postwar era.
This book is not that definitive treatment. It is at best a preliminary
report, a concise primer for the novice, the student of American
politics who upon dipping into the fetid backwash of the 1960s comes
across agitated references to Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, or the
Committee on the Present Danger and wonders what all the fuss was about.
In explaining the commotion stirred up by the "neocons," John Ehrman, a
lecturer in history at George Washington University, hews to the
fundamentals. He identifies the main players, outlines the themes of
their frequently controversial writings, and provides a straightforward
(if peculiarly bloodless) account of their rise to public prominence.
It is a workmanlike performance: well-researched, well-organized, and
informative. Yet the result succeeds as description rather than
analysis. Respectful of his dramatis personae-perhaps unduly so-the
author does not challenge them. Indeed, the book's chief shortcoming
lies in Mr. Ehrman's seeming reluctance to grapple with the
neoconservative legacy, to engage their Cold War ideas from our post-
Cold War vantage point.
In characterizing one particular group of neoconservatives, the author
observes that "They took words very seriously, believing that they had
real consequences." The remark is an apt one that applies to neocons
generally. Indeed, this insistence upon taking words and ideas seriously
is chief among the qualities that make writers like Podhoretz, Kristol,
Midge Decter, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Walter Laqueur-all of whom figure
prominently in this account-so interesting and so formidable.
As faithful readers of Commentary-long the leading journal of
neoconservatism-know, when neocons engage in intellectual combat, they
play for keeps. The game is not for the squeamish or thin-skinned. At
the top of their form, neoconservative writers fashion polemics like a
military campaign, employing massive force directed at the point of
greatest vulnerability. The aim is not to trade blows with the
adversary tit-for-tat. It is to overwhelm him. The intended result is
not an "exchange" but victory: complete, decisive, and with no prisoners
taken.
Having made their reputation by exposing the errors, inconsistencies,
and inanities of their former compatriots on the left, neoconservatives
expect to be held accountable for their own judgments and prescriptions:
this too is the way that the game is played.
Thus, as today's sprawling, vibrant, and fractious political right
struggles to define the principles that should guide American foreign
policy into the next century, a critical analysis of neoconservative
thought during some of the Cold War's darkest days would be both timely
and beneficial. The point is not to second-guess. Rather, it is to
determine whether there exists a discernible neoconservative angle of
vision that remains relevant to the issues of the present day-issues
that differ fundamentally from those that neocons addressed with such
relentless ferocity and penetrating insight in the confused aftermath of
the 1960s.
In short, with the Cold War won and threats to Israel's security
(arguably) in decline, how much there is still there? Do the ideas
espoused by neoconservatives comprise a distinctive variant of modern
conservatism? (Ehrman gives the question only passing attention.) Or are
the neocons simply a cluster of cranky intellectuals animated by a
shared disgust with the excesses of the 1960s and a contempt for the
timorousness of the 1970s but now soon to pass from the scene? (The
author's effort to identify a successor generation is unpersuasive.)
More to the point, on the eve of a new millennium, what do these
apostates from the left-many of whom insist that labels notwithstanding
they remain "true" liberals-bring to efforts to move the debate over
American foreign policy beyond the stale dichotomy of globalism vs.
isolationism?
Admirers of the neocons will argue that their accumulated writings have
much to contribute to that debate. Yet to draw out that contribution
requires not deference but a systematic effort to subject those writings
to critical scrutiny. Only by evaluating neoconservative ideas-shaped by
the ideological imperatives of the Cold War-in terms of the post-Cold
War era's radically altered frame of reference can we adapt the neocon
legacy to our own purposes.
A.J. Bacevich is Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Updated: 13 July 2002
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