The Public Square


Richard John Neuhaus


Copyright (c) 1992 First Things 19 (January 1992): 54-64.

The Real John Dewey

This writer has sometimes puzzled friends and critics alike by expressing a firm, though qualified, admiration for John Dewey. John Dewey?! You mean that arch–secular humanist, that despiser of religious "supersitition," that progressivist despoiler of our once commonsensical public schools? Yes, that John Dewey. He got an awful lot of things quite wrong, but Dewey did understand, as few intellectuals today do understand, that the American democratic experiment is indeed an experiment. He knew that it is an experiment that cannot be sustained without a public philosophy, and that such a public philosophy must be grounded in moral truth. Those were some of the great things that John Dewey got right. Regrettably, the public philosophy he proposed was, in our judgment, wrong on its merits, and it was and is shared by few Americans. A philosphical foundation for democracy that is neither understood nor accepted by the people who constitute the democracy in question is of limited use in sustaining that democracy.

We have sometimes described the purpose of this journal and its related enterprises in terms of "advancing a religiously grounded public philosophy for the democratic experiment in freedom and virtue." John Dewey would have been at home with such a formulation, except the religion that he had in mind was his very uncommon "common faith" that he contrived as a replacement for the "traditional religion" that he thought hopelessly outdated. Much of what Dewey got right, however, is brilliantly and readably set forth by Robert B. Westbrook of the University of Rochester in a major new book, John Dewey and American Democracy (Cornell). Westbrook laments the fact that relatively few thinkers today pay much attention to Dewey. Even more lamentable, many who are interested in Dewey have come to him through Richard Rorty, the philosopher turned literary critic who claims to be Dewey's apostle in our time.

As faithful readers know, this writer has his own problems with Richard Rorty (see "Joshing Mr. Rorty," December 1990). Robert Westbroook's concerns are closely related to those problems. He begins by noting, very delicately, that Rorty's appropriation of Dewey "is a controversial one." Rorty himself has on occasion admitted that his self–identification with Dewey should not be taken too literally. "Sometimes," Rorty says, "when we think we are rediscovering the mighty dead, we are just inventing imaginary playmates." Exactly, says Mr. Westbrook. He then goes on to detail some of the dramatic differences between Rorty and Dewey. "Rorty urges philosophers to abandon claims to knowledge and rest content with 'edifying,' 'therapeutic' criticism; Dewey, while also warning sternly of the 'conceit of knowledge,' worried as well that philosophy that was merely edifying would degenerate into little more than an expression of 'cloudy desire.' Rorty sees philosophy as playful; Dewey insisted it was, as an intellectualized wish, hard work. Rorty argues that there is no need for social theorists to consider such topics as 'the nature of selfhood, the motive of moral behavior, and the meaning of human life.' Dewey thought that as a social theorist he had to say something about such things. 'On the Deweyan view,' Rorty says, 'no such discipline as 'philosophical anthropology' is required as a preface to politics'; Dewey's view was quite otherwise. Rorty seeks to deconstruct philosophy; Dewey sought to reconstruct it. As Richard Bernstein has said, what Rorty slights or dismisses as 'trivial' or 'mistaken' in Dewey's thought is his primary concern with 'the role that philosophy might play after one had been liberated from the obsessions and tyrannies of the 'problems of philosophy.' Perhaps the best way to sum up briefly the differences separating Dewey and Rorty as philosophers is to say that, while both ruthlessly undercut the quest for certainty, Dewey believed effective cultural criticism still might profit from the general 'ground–maps' that philosophers could provide. Finding such maps useless and unnecessary, Rorty argues for cultural criticism that flies entirely by the seat of its pants."

Although Westbrook doesn't put it quite this way, he suggests that Rorty, very unlike Dewey, is something of a poseur, a morally as well as intellectually frivolous figure. "Pressed by critics to make clearer his moral and political commitments," writes Westbrook, "Rorty has said enough of late to suggest that his social hope as well as his view of the responsibilities of philosophy differ significantly from Dewey's. Refusing to accept the ethical postulate conjoining self–realization and the social good which was at the heart of Dewey's ethics throughout his career, Rorty has argued for a 'liberal utopia' in which there prevails a rigid division between a rich, autonomous private sphere that will enable elite 'ironists' like himself to create freely the self they wish–even if that bares a cruel, antidemocratic self–and a lean, egalitiarian, 'democratic' public life confined to the task of preventing cruelty (including that of elite ironists). For Dewey, of course, democracy was a 'way of life' not merely a way of public life–an ideal that 'must affect all modes of human association'–and he would not have accepted Rorty's contention that 'there is no way to bring self–creation together with justice at the level of theory' for that would have required him to give up a principal article of democratic faith. Rorty contends that the belief that 'the springs of private fulfillment and of human solidarity are the same' is a bothersome Platonic or Christian hangover. If so, Dewey suffered from it."

John Dewey deserves to be rediscovered, and John Dewey and American Democracy should help that to happen. Dewey had the right project, no matter how flawed his prosecution of it. Like other public philosophers such as Walter Lippmann, John Courtney Murray, and Reinhold Niebuhr, he understood that the self–evident truths on which this experiment is premised are not self–evident to most people; they have to be rediscovered and rearticulated in every generation. Dewey's great mistake was to think that he could break those truths away from their necessary and continuing dependence upon biblical religion. He lived in a time when the best and the brightest were miseducated to believe that traditional religion was simply beyond the pale of plausibility for the truly enlightened. The cultural hegemony of that rationalist dogma is no longer very secure. Indeed it is collapsing all around us. Perhaps some young scholar reading John Dewey and American Democracy will aspire to become a new John Dewey, only this time advancing a public philosophy that is in critical conversation with a common faith that is enduringly common.

The Catholic Church As Interest Group

In 1976 the Administrative Board of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) issued a 3,400–word voter guide called "Political Responsibility." They've been doing it every few years since then. The 1992 edition, "Political Responsibility: Revitalizing American Democracy," is 8,700 words. In tone and substance the guide hasn't changed all that much over the years. The current statement is more explicit in pushing affirmative action in order to, it says, overcome the results of racism in the past.

The political positions endorsed by the USCC are clustered in issues under letters "A" to "Q." (Foreign policy is bunched together under "P.") The politically correct who watch their Ps and Qs are warned at the end of Q: "This is not an exclusive listing of the issues that concern us. . . . Thus, we are advocates on many other social justice concerns such as welfare reform, the civil and political rights of the elderly and persons with disabling conditions, the reform of our criminal justice system, and the protection of the land and the environment." That comes after a seemingly interminable list of things that concern the USCC, just in case anything was left out. A leftward activist group in Washington, D.C., has the name now, but it seems increasingly appropriate that the USCC offices should be designated The Center of Concern.

There are trenchant statements on protecting the unborn and on the evil of active euthanasia, together with a call for equitable tax support for school choice and support for increased immigration. But the bishops propose an awfully long list of things on which they want the Catholic faithful, and indeed the entire citizenry, to take them seriously. (A USCC staffer, reminded that the bishops had declared abortion to be the Number One issue for the Catholic Church, responds, "True enough, but you must remember we have at least seven or eight Number One issues.") Apart from the issues mentioned, the positions and directions endorsed by "Political Responsiblity" are pretty much those of the New York Times editorial page. Nor is the form and substance of argument that much different.

The document bears all the marks of apparatchiks grinding out a party line according to bureaucratic schedule. The document issues from a staff–driven and schedule–driven process. It is not done because there is an outcry from the faithful wanting political guidance from the bishops on a hundred and one issues. It is done because it was done before. Busy bishops in brief assembly are presented with one more item for approval on a crowded agenda. Those who had time to read it in advance are reluctant to take up the time of the meeting in debating this issue or that, never mind raising the question of whether the Church or the nation really needs a Political Platform of the Catholic Church. Such statements are made, in largest part, because there is a structure for making them. And because other churches and interest groups in Washington, all of whom have a position on almost everything, expect the Catholic Church to have a position on agricultural appropriations, trade policy with Japan, or whatever is agitating some Congressional subcommittee tomorrow morning. Inside the beltway, not to have a position is not to be. How refreshing it would be were the Catholic Church, or any church, to defy the imperiousness of that political ontology. But, alas, it seems that is not to be.

Efforts Well Understood

It is likely that considerably fewer people will read "Political Responsibility" than will read this commentary on it. So maybe we should just ignore it. But that would be a mistake. For numerous lobbyists and activists in Washington and state capitals, it is an imprimatur for the pursuit of their political penchants. To the satisfaction or irritation of politicians and journalists, it reflects "the Catholic position" on a host of disputed questions. The bishops protest that the Church is not merely an interest group, but the protest will be lost on anyone paying attention to this political platform. The bishops insist that they are not taking partisan positions. Their concern is "revitalizing American democracy." "Ironically," they write, "when people in other parts of the world are embracing democratic values and struggling to participate in public life, many Americans seem increasingly disinterested or disenchanted with politics." Perhaps one reason some people are uninterested or disenchanted is that they are weary of political factionalism dressed up in religious garb as a disinterested search for the common good.

"What we seek," the bishops say, "is not a religious interest group, but a community of conscience within the larger society, testing public life on these central [moral] values. Our starting point and objectives are neither partisan nor ideological, but are focused on the fundamental dignity of the human person, which cuts across the political categories of our day." It was, as we recall, George McGovern who first had the cheek to dub his faction "the constituency of conscience." The bishops say they must speak out to lift up "the human and moral dimensions" of public policy–dimensions with which others are presumably less concerned. Such unseemly boasting will not be welcomed by conscientious Christians and Jews who do not have the luxury of pontificating from the sidelines. As for cutting across political categories, the positions favored by the bishops–with the very important exceptions noted above–run the gamut from Mario Cuomo to the groupies on the left of the senior senator from Massachusetts.

"Unfortunately," the bishops acknowledge, "our efforts in this area are sometimes misunderstood. The church's participation in public affairs is not a threat to the political process or to genuine pluralism, but an affirmation of their importance." But most of those who "misunderstand" what the bishops are doing with this kind of political platform are not worried about the threat that it poses to the political process. They are worried about the threat that it poses to the integrity of the Church; they are worried about the corruption of the teaching office of the bishop; they are worried about Catholicism following mainline/oldline Protestantism into the swamps of politicized religion. Those who criticize the politicized institutional habits represented by "Political Responsibility" understand all too well what is happening.

The remedy for such statements is not to make them more "balanced," never mind more "conservative." The remedy, for the most part, is not to make them at all. When it is not necessary for the Church to speak, it is necessary for the Church not to speak. "Political Responsibility" is issued in the name of the bishops, but the voice is that of partisan players in the political games that keep Washington in thrall to its overweening delusions of self–importance. With the exceptions noted, the statement proposes no warrant or necessity for the bishops to speak apart from their putatively superior moral concern and wisdom. With the exceptions noted, all that they say is being said loudly and incessantly by numerous other groups. "Political Responsibility" reads like a banal, imitative, and dismally dull political broadside from yet another liberal interest group. The Catholic Church, indeed any church, should aspire to doing better than that, to being more than that.

The Sources of Tolerance

James Davison Hunter's Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (Basic Books) is receiving a good deal of deserved attention. Hunter, an important participant in the program of the Institute on Religion and Public Life, elaborates in careful sociological fashion some of the foundational ideas that brought this journal into being. The most important of those ideas is that politics is in largest part a function of culture, and at the heart of culture is religion (whether it is called religion or not). Thus, as we have said so often, American public life is best understood in terms of a Kulturkampf, a battle over the ideas, moralities, stories, and symbols by which we will order our life together. The great merit of Hunter's work is that he has taken those ideas and fleshed them out with sociological theory and very useful data.

An extended review of Culture Wars will appear in a forthcoming issue. Our purpose here is to comment on one and, we expect, one fairly typical reaction to the Kulturkampf argument. It is by Alan Wolfe of New York's New School, writing in The New Republic (November 11, 1991). Wolfe observes that Americans are peculiar in the way that they invest their public energies in cultural rather than properly political issues. "It is not because Americans are politically sophisticated that they constantly frustrate those who would understand them," he writes, "but because they are politically innocent. Unable to abolish war, they have abolished politics; the state has not withered away, but the amount of attention paid to its affairs has withered badly." In what Hunter describes as a war between cosmologies–with secular modernists on the one side and orthodox believers on the other–Wolfe is beyond doubt on the modernist side. He admires the way that Hunter "remains neutral" in his analysis of the war, but he finally thinks such neutrality impossible.

Wolfe writes: "Nowhere is the difference between these worldviews clearer than in the fundamentalist assumption, cited numerous times throughout Hunter's book, that we are a Christian nation. At the risk of seeming intolerant of those who hold this position, we are not. There are Jews, Muslims, and any number of other non–Christians who live here and claim the rights of citizens. Fundamentalist language excludes them; liberal modernist language includes them. This is the reason, finally, that Hunter's evenhandedness fails: only one side in this war can live with the other. And the other side cannot reciprocate the respect."

The liberal modernist, says Wolfe, is willing to grant the "fundamentalist" the right to dissent, just so long as religion doesn't get in the way of the liberal ordering of society. At the heart of that order is the axiom of "faith in private and toleration in public"–i.e., the naked public square. Wolfe, and so many of like mind, just don't get it. Their notion of compromise is, "Let's compromise, we'll do it our way." Their notion of tolerance is, "We'll tolerate you so long as you don't trouble us with your different ideas." Some compromise. Some tolerance.

The simplistic worldview espoused by Wolfe is apparently impervious to the fact that even his liberal tolerance cannot stand on its own feet. He repeatedly adverts to democratic "process" and "procedure" as though the style of public discourse he favors is self–evidently right and therefore requires no justification. He does not offer an argument, he simply states a prejudice. The prejudice is most specifically against religion in public. "In a nation composed of people with diverse religious beliefs, no single religion can provide the moral framework for a public vocabulary," he writes. If a "single religion" can mean the Judeo–Christian tradition broadly construed, the assertion is obviously false. That tradition does provide the public vocabulary. Historically and at present, it also provides the way of including other vocabularies, such as that of ancient Athens and even of the secular liberalism that Wolfe favors.

In a magazine as sophisticated as The New Republic sometimes is, it is remarkable to find the tired complaint about this not being "a Christian nation." Of course this is not a Christian nation in the way that the Puritans intended the Bay Colony to be a Christian commonwealth. Our public life is manifestly not characterized by Christian virtues. But demographically and culturally it is equally obvious that this is a Christian nation. More than 90 percent of the American people claim to be Christians. Unless Mr. Wolfe is prepared to impose a theological or moral test for "true Christianity," it seems rather willful of him to deny that these people are Christians.

Would the Wolfes of our secularized elites deny any other generalization about this society that was borne out in the case of 90 percent or more of the population? How about the assertion that America is an English–speaking nation? It seems very doubtful that Mr. Wolfe would respond to that assertion by writing, "At the risk of seeming intolerant to those who hold this position, we are not. There are Spanish–speakers, and Chinese–speakers, and the speakers of any number of other languages who live here and claim the rights of citizens." America is Christian in the way that it is English–speaking. Relatively few speak the language very well, there is little agreement on how it should be spoken, some speak it hardly at all, but they all live here and claim the rights of citizens.

What James Hunter obviously has not gotten Alan Wolfe to understand is that the overwhelming majority of Americans derive their moral vocabulary and moral judgments, directly or indirectly, from religion. Whether we like that or not, it is the social fact. And the religion in question is overwhelmingly Christian of a sort that is comfortable in affirming a Judeo–Christian tradition. In private and in public, most Americans speak Christian–although when speaking in public many of them think it is their Christian duty (or a constitutional requirement) that they pretend that they are not speaking Christian. The secular dogma, propounded by Wolfe and many others, that religion must be contained entirely in the private sphere only encourages the pretense. The result, ironically, is that many Americans are discouraged from making in public the religiously grounded moral arguments for tolerating liberal secularists such as Alan Wolfe.

Evangelicals Onward and Upward

It has long been recognized that church membership statistics are notoriously unreliable, not least because different churches define membership in dramatically different ways. For instance, a Lutheran parish that counts as members all who have been baptized may have 600 members but only 250 at Sunday worship. Some large evangelical "megachurches," on the other hand, have done away with membership rolls altogether. Other evangelical churches may have several thousand at Sunday services but count only 300 members. That is because they have more exacting criteria of religious experience and commitment for membership.

Evangelicals, says Randall Balmer of Columbia University, have always been a larger percentage of the population than the usual statistics suggest. "Indeed," says Balmer, "the chances are good that, due to widespread popular disillusionment with liberal Protestantism, someone whose name appears as a member of a mainline denomination actually shows up for worship at an evangelical church." Balmer concludes: "Despite published statistics, there can be little doubt that now in the final decade of the twentieth century, the real energy of American Protestantism lies, for better or worse, with the evangelicals. For them, membership statistics tell us very little about their influence within the larger culture."

That observation may find support in a recent nationwide poll that asked 1,060 adults about their impressions of various denominations. Twenty–nine percent had a "very favorable" impression of the Baptist, 23 percent of the Roman Catholic, 18 percent of the Methodist, 12 percent of the Lutheran and Presbyterian, and 6 percent of the Mormon. Why no church gets more than a 29 percent "very favorable" rating is something that the pollsters do not attempt to explain.

Behavior–Borne Disease

There has been much debate over mandatory AIDS testing of medical workers. Columnist Charles Krauthammer thinks mandatory testing is a very bad idea. It would, he says, be fiscally reckless and impracticable. HIV is spread by people who already have HIV, and finally the only answer is an ethical one of "reveal or refrain." Either such people reveal their condition or refrain from the behavior that infects others. Krauthammer writes:

"In the public mind, the allocation of blame for AIDS has seen three stages. When the cause of AIDS first became known, AIDS patients were seen as victims of their own appetites. Then, with Ryan White, the young hemophiliac, they began to be seen as victims of fate. Now, AIDS activists are trying to portray AIDS patients as the victims of society: of an indifferent majority, of public silence, of government inaction, of drug company avarice, of Catholic homophobia.

"Some epidemics can be laid at the feet of government and some cannot. Cholera is a government–controllable and, in some ways, government–induced epidemic. If you don't treat the sewage, people will die. But that model does not apply to a disease that is not waterborne, or airborne but behavior–borne. In a free society, government can do little to influence the spread of a behavioral epidemic, and AIDS is the quintessential behavioral epidemic.

"The main role of government is to protect the civil rights of AIDS sufferers and to try to find a cure. (The federal government spends a staggering $3.7 billion a year on AIDS, $1.2 billion of it on research.) The rest depends on the private decision of individual citizens and, in particular, of the only ones in a position to spread AIDS: HIV carriers."

Responding to the "Sects"

We have commented from time to time on the growing rivalry between Catholicism and evangelical/fundamentalist Protestantism, especially in Latin America. And we have worried that Catholic leaders have sometimes, in their polemic against "the sects," run the risk of compromising the Church's ecumenical understanding of the ways in which all Christians are, however imperfectly, already one in Christ and His Church. Speaking to this set of problems in its North American context (which is in large part an immigrant extension of the Latin American experience), Bishop Roberto O. Gonzalez of Boston, writing in America (October 19, 1991), has some important counsel for Catholics: "To speak

of the new evangelization and of catechesis for Hispanics in this country, one must address the topic of the sects. I think that it should be said a thousand times that part of the success of the sects is their evangelical foundation, their unabashed rootedness in the Gospel–that they seem to present Christ in all His power as the foundation of new life, of conversion, of forgiveness of sins. Their preaching seems to be based solely upon the person and power of Christ. Thus, when speaking of a catechesis for a new evangelization, this catechesis should include a presentation of the gospel with these same characteristics, teaching how everything in Catholic life is related to its foundation, the person and power of Christ. . . . From the point of view of religious phenomena, sects will always be with us. We thus have to be careful lest an anti–sect mentality rule our response to them. For the sects can remind us of the need to be more faithful to our religious identity and mission. In this sense, the sects challenge us to be more serenely faithful to our mission of preaching the Gospel, of evangelizing, of catechizing. The more we are faithful to our mission, the fewer the people who will defect and the fewer the inroads the sects can make. Sects present an opportunity for us to be stronger in our faith, more Catholic, more evangelical, more convinced–which we ought to be anyway. The sects, in this sense, have a providential dimension. We cannot appear, therefore, to be competing with the sects, because then we become another sect. We succumb to an intra–sect battle. The church is not a sect. Yet the church is called by the Lord to be more church."

While We're At It

Sources: Statistics on Evangelicals in National Christian Reporter, October 25, 1991. Charles Krauthammer on AIDS in nationally syndicated column, including New York Daily News, October 7, 1991. Linda Ellerbee on having it all, New York Times, March 15, 1991. Charles Moore on Gerard Manley Hopkins in The Spectator, 13 April 1991. Lynn Wardle on no–fault divorce in Brigham Young University Law Review, Volume 1991, No. 1. Richard McBrien quoted in National Catholic Register, October 6, 1991. Misspelling and miscalculation in Carnegie Council bulletin, Fall 1991. Robert Jenson on Carl Braaten, dialog, Autumn 1991. Boris Yeltsin quotation cited in America, October 19, 1991. Max Stackhouse comment on Protestantism in Being Christian Today: An American Conversation, forthcoming from Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C. Joe Klein on Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., New Republic, November 11, 1991. Jimmy Carter remarks cited in National Christian Reporter, October 18, 1991. Peter Singer on the euthanasia debate, The New York Review of Books, August 15, 1991. On Lilly Endowment meeting, National Christian Reporter, October 18, 1991. Bill Moyers interview in Washington Post Magazine, September 1, 1991. Archbishop Tauran quoted by Catholic News Service, October 31, 1991. On Jesuits at the Campion Renewal Center, 1991–1992 bulletin from Campion Renewal Center. Matthew Parris on "coming out" in The Spectator, 10 August 1991.